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issues of this Convention were Europe’s role in the international community, the concerns of the 
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During the annual Munich Conference on Security Policy in the first week of February 2004, 
when representatives of the security communities of Europe, the United States and other parts of 
the world met in the Bavarian capital, Latin America was not a topic at all. A week after this 
event - as part of his 2004 European goodwill tour - Colombian president Uribe made a visit to 
Germany asking for more support for his fight against political violence and narcotics trafficking 
in his country. He received a mixed response, including protests and critics in the European 
Parliament
2; the meeting with the Italian premier Berlusconi was cancelled
3. In Germany the 
reception was more benign – including talks with the federal minister of the interior, the federal 
minister of economic cooperation and development, the leader of the opposition, the president of 
the German parliament, the federal minister of foreign affairs, Joschka Fischer, and with 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder; the results, however, were modest.
4  As Uribe is a particularly 
close ally of the U.S. government not only in international affairs, but also in his approach to 
fight the guerrillas and drug trafficking in his country, the rather cool reception he encountered in 
Europe could also be a hint at some old or new fissures on Latin American politics between the 
United States and Europe.  
 
On the other side of the Atlantic – also in February – Secretary of State Powell 
announced a reduction of foreign aid to Latin America for the fiscal year 2005, because Latin 
America is not a top priority in U.S. foreign policy
5. Some Democrats in the House of 
Representatives criticized this proposal, but it was not a topic that entered media headlines. This 
reduction in foreign aid came only four months after the OAS Special Conference on Security in 
October 2003
6, where the OAS member states had reached a consensus on the fact that extreme 
poverty and social exclusion of broad sectors of the population affect political stability and 
democracy in the Western Hemisphere, because they erode social cohesion and undermine 
security.  
                                                           
1 The present paper is based on an analysis of official and semi-official policy-papers of the German government 
and other institutions with special interests in Latin America, as well as of documents of the German government 
and development assistance agencies and EU documents. In addition, numerous interviews with Latin American 
diplomats in Berlin, German MPs, members of the staff of the Federal Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defense, 
members of the staff of the German political foundations, and other experts on German-Latin American Relations 
have been conducted in February and March 2004. However, the paper reflects only the personal opinion of the 
author and does not represent any official German position on the  issues discussed. 
2 The Colombian President Alvaro Uribe appeared before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the EP on the 12/2/2004 
following his address to a formal session of the European Parliament's plenary assembly the same day, in which 
nearly half of the MPs did not attend the session or left in protest. He found himself facing strong criticism over his 
country's current security policy and breaches of human rights by the MPs of ELDR, EUL/NGL, and the Greens, 
and scepticism from the PES (EP-News Report 11-02-2004).  
3 Shortly after Uribe’s European tour, the Spanish premier Aznar – his most important ally in Europe - made a visit  
to Colombia to show support for Uribe’s policies, especially for his fight against terrorism. 
4 Germany’s potential contributions to support a peaceful settlement of the Colombian conflict seem quite limited. 
However, German political and civil society actors may have a role to play as an “honest broker”, helping to mediate 
between different Colombian actors and to encourage the discussion on a common post-conflict perspective. See 
Sabine Kurtenbach, Gewalteindämmendes Engagement externer Akteure in Kolumbien. Studie im Rahmen eines 
vom Auswärtigen Amt finanzierten Drittmittelprojekts, Hamburg: Institut für Iberoamerika-Kunde, Januar 2004.   
5 See the commentary by Andres Oppenheimer “It’s official: Latin America not a top priority”, in: The Miami 
Herald, February 15,  2004. 
(http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/columnists/andres_oppenheimer/7957764.htm)  
6 On the Conference and its results see the OAS 
website:http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.oas.org/csh/english   3 
 
In principle the European Union and Germany could be extra-hemispheric partners 
contributing additional funds to Latin America, which could match the United States efforts in 
the region. But such a move would depend on the availability of additional funds as well as on 
the convergence of foreign policy interests and approaches in the Western Hemisphere. In the 
past, the countries of the European Union have been Latin America’s most important partner 
regarding development aid and cooperation, transferring higher funds than the United States.
7 
 
In this general context the present paper will ask the following questions: 
 
•  What are the central positions of German foreign policy regarding Latin America, and 
what importance is given to Latin America in German foreign policy? Are there any 
particular security concerns?  
•  Are there substantial differences in the perception of security threats in the Western 
Hemisphere between the German government and Latin American governments or the 
United States administration? 
•  Are there differences in the instruments and strategies chosen to confront these security 
threats? 
•  Is there a common European foreign policy towards Latin America, and if so, can 
particular German interests or contributions be found in it?  
 
Let us begin with the last question: As of today, there does not exist any special German 
position in security issues on Latin America. The German Latin America policy is part of the 
European common foreign and security policy. This fact is interpreted positively by German 
politicians. Many in the foreign policy community argue that German interests in Latin America 
are better represented as part of a common European Latin America policy than individually. 
Others argue that this could be the way to get rid off a minor topic in foreign relations in order to 
save time for more serious foreign policy matters. If one takes a look at the hot spots in Latin 
America – for instance, Colombia, Venezuela, Cuba, and currently Haiti – and analyzes the 
official German statements, nearly all of them include a reference to common EU positions. 
Therefore much of what will be said about German Latin American policy may also be valid for 
other European countries or the European Union as a whole. 
 
German Interests in Latin America 
  
Latin America is more like a hobby or a matter of special interest than a central topic in German 
foreign policy. There are less than a dozen MPs who articulate strong interest in Latin American 
affairs, while some thirty show a more general interest
8. Plenary debates on Latin America take 
place at late hours with low political attendance and little public resonance. When the German 
parliament (Bundestag) in February (12/2/2004) debated a resolution of the CDU opposition 
party on Venezuela, it was the last point on the agenda (following a discussion on promoting 
bike tourism in Germany) and the plenary session ended after 9.00 p.m.
9  
                                                           
7 For statistical data see Susanne Gratius, Spielt Europa in Lateinamerika noch eine Rolle?, in: Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte B 38-38/2003, p.38-46. 
8 Nevertheless, formally the number of MPs with a general interest in the region is higher. There are 76 MPs in the 
German-South American parliamentary group, 47 in the German-Brazilian parliamentary group, 22 in the German-
Mexican parliamentary group and 61 in the German-Central American parliamentary group. This interest, however, 
generally is of rather low profile and does not include sustained involvement in foreign policy formulation regarding 
the region. 
9 See protocol of the 91st Plenary Session February 12, 2004 
http://www.bundestag.de/plenargeschehen/pp/91/index.html   4 
 
While this is not good, it could be worse. In Germany, there is possibly still more interest 
in Latin American affairs than in most other European countries, with the exception, of course, 
of Spain and Portugal. Analyzing the debates in the Bundestag and the questions of the MPs 
directed towards the government
10 in the first two years of Schröder’s second term, it must be 
conceded that all major topics concerning Latin America indeed have been tackled. There have 
been questions or debates on the human rights situation in Guatemala, the conflict in Colombia, 
the crisis in Venezuela, the youth gangs and children of the streets in Honduras, the report of the 
Truth Commission in Peru, the political and social turmoil in Bolivia and the economic 
breakdown and its fallout in Argentina. If one takes a look at the debates, the MPs in general 
demonstrated a reasonably good understanding of the problems of the region, but only a few 
MPs attended the plenary sessions.   
 
Latin America has never been a top priority in German foreign policy, nor have there 
been any special traditional security concerns. Taking into account the geographical distance, the 
lack of any significant past as a colonial power in the region, and the uneven levels of economic 
development between Germany and Latin America, it would be surprising if it were otherwise. 
Today, as in the last 50 years, trade and investment are the core of German-Latin American 
relations. But in the 1990s German companies scaled down their activities in Latin America; as a 
result, Germany’s economic position in the region, while still considerable, has been weakened.  
The process of reunification, the restructuring of the German economy, the appeal of the Asian 
markets and the growing investment opportunities in Eastern Europe, a traditional zone of 
influence and interest for Germany, can be seen as key factors contributing to this trend. 
 
Today, both German investments and commercial exchange with Latin America are low. 
In 2003 only about 2% of German exports and imports were with Latin America. Only 4.5% 
(2001) of worldwide German FDI (stock) is located in Latin America – down from 6.1% ten 
years ago (1991)
11. According to the official statistics of the German Central Bank (Deutsche 
Bundesbank), German FDI (stock) ranks only 7
th (2002) in Latin America; however, if we 
include local reinvestment of German subsidiaries and investment via third countries, Germany, 
with an investment stock of 42 billions US-$  (2001), still ranks third after the United States and 
Spain. German FDI is highly concentrated, with two thirds being located in Mexico and Brazil.  
The Sao Paulo region has attracted 800 subsidiaries of German companies, making it the world’s 
greatest German industrial center outside of Germany. The value of German production in Latin 
America is four times higher than the value of German exports to the region.  
 
Any serious deterioration of socioeconomic or political conditions in Latin America will 
influence German economic interests in the region – especially if these events happen in 
countries of major German economic activities. As a trading nation, Germany will always be 
                                                           
10 Every member of the Bundestag may submit two questions to the federal government during the so-called 
“Question Hour” (“Fragestunde”)  in each week with plenary sessions. In addition, up to four questions per month 
may be submitted for written reply. This right is claimed principally by the MPs of the opposition. Major 
interpellations (“Große Anfrage”) may be submitted to the President by a parliamentary group or by at least 31 MPs. 
As soon as the federal government has given its reply, the issue is placed on the agenda and debated. There are also 
minor interpellations (“Kleine Anfragen”) which also must be signed by a parliamentary group or by at least 
31 MPs. The minor interpellations are considered dealt with once the Federal Government has replied in writing. 
11 Information based on data of the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the Ibero-Amerika Verein 
(Ibero-America Association) in Hamburg, see: Peter Rösler, “Ausländische Direktinvestitionen in Lateinamerika”, 
Brennpunkt Lateinamerika 16-2003, Hamburg. 
(http://www.duei.de/iik/shop/csc_articles.php?saSearch[category]=Brennpunkt%20Lateinamerika)   5 
interested in stable economic and political conditions as well as in economic growth in its partner 
countries in Latin America. 
 
German economic relations with Latin America are in line with those of most EU 
countries. Latin America participates only with around 5 to 6 % in the foreign trade of the EU 
countries and in the 1990s the European Union has lost terrain in Latin America to the United 
States.  A comment made by the EU External Relations Commissioner, Christopher Patten, 
highlights the limited importance that trade with Latin American countries has for the European 
Union: “Brazil is the number one trade partner for the European Union in Latin America, but 
globally it is only our trade partner number fourteen. The European Union trades more with 
Vietnam than with Venezuela, more with Kazakhstan than with Colombia, more with 
Bangladesh than with Peru, more with Mauritius than with Ecuador, and more with Aruba than 
with Bolivia. The picture improves if you take the regional blocks together: Mercosur is our 
eleventh largest trading partner and the Andean Community our twenty-ninth.”
12 
 
Some commentators, for instance Andres Oppenheimer
13, expect a further deterioration 
of economic relations between the European Union and Latin America as a result of the EU’s 
enlargement in 2004. The next EU-Latin American Summit in Mexico in May 2004 could give 
some indication as to the future relations between the two regions. However, there still is some 
potential for reversing the negative trends. The Free Trade Agreements between the European 
Union and Mexico and between the European Union and Chile have been pushing both 
countries’ exports to Europe.
14  A successful conclusion of the negotiations on a free trade 
agreement between the European Union and Mercosur and between the European Union and the 
Andean Community could provide a similar stimulus. In addition, an enlarged European market 
could attract more exports from Latin America. 
 
Latin America’s declining economic relevance has repercussions for the political 
cooperation between Latin America and the EU/Germany. The German unification process, the 
changes in Eastern Europe, the security problems in the Balkans, the EU’s enlargement, the 
challenges of the post-September 11 world, and the conflicts in the Near East have all 
contributed to Latin America stepping further down on the agenda of European foreign politics. 
In comparison with other world regions Latin America produces few headlines in the newspapers 
or spotlights in TV programs. Many German and European politicians perceive Latin America as 
a region, which is located far away, poses few security risks, and is part of the United States’ 
zone of influence. They also expect that the U.S. government should take care of security-related 
issues in the region. If the Europeans do have to confront Latin American topics, quite often a 
quasi-natural division of labor comes into play: the Spanish take the lead, while other European 
countries concentrate their efforts in their specific zones of influence or interests. This attitude, 
however, has been contested by other political, social and economic actors within the different 
European countries, which are in favor of a more active Latin American policy.   
 
A decade ago, in the middle of the 1990s, the German government elaborated its first so-
called “Lateinamerikakonzept” as an official point of reference on Latin American foreign 
policy. This programmatic statement also had some influence on the definition of European Latin 
                                                           
12 See Canning House Lecture: EU-Latin America Relations, London 04/02/04;  
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/speech04_61.htm  
13 See Andres Oppenheimer, EU’s expansion may hurt Latin America, in: The Miami Herald February 1, 2004. 
14 Chilean exports to Europe grew by 18% in the first year (2003) of the free trade agreement with the EU, from 
2000 to 2002 the annual growth rate has been 1% (Gobierno de Chile, Dirección General de Relaciones Económicas 
Internacionales, Aspectos destacadas del primer ano de vigencia del Acuerdo de Asociación Chile-Unión Europea, 
Santiago, 30 de enero 2004).    6 
American policy.
15 However, this path was not continued and the official German policy 
framework towards Latin America was not updated. There has been some work in the Federal 
Foreign Office on five more extensive and multifaceted sub-regional concepts for Latin 
America
16 (as well as for other world regions), but these efforts stopped half way because of 
bureaucratic problems and a certain work overload in the ministry. Indications are that in the 
future the German government will return to a more general and more condensed definition of its 
priorities regarding Latin America, giving a more prominent role to the programs of the different 
ministries with particular interests in the region. 
 
Today only the federal ministry for economic cooperation and development has an updated 
strategy paper on Latin American policy (dated February 15, 2000, substituting the 1992 
version)
17. This could be interpreted as a downgrading of the region in German foreign policy
18 
or as an indicator that most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are now perceived first 
of all as part of the development cooperation agenda. But it could also be interpreted as 
indicating a change in the security definition and threat perception by the German government. 
There are arguments to support both interpretations: 
 
•  Few Latin American countries are of major economic interest for Germany (Mexico, 
Brazil, and, with some distance, Argentina). 
 
•  Latin America is perceived as a zone of peace in international relations, because nearly 
all border conflicts have been settled through negotiations. The Latin American countries 
are part of most of the relevant international regimes for the control and non-proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction. In these foreign policy issues Latin America is regarded 
more as an ally than as a problem, therefore receiving less attention by the German 
federal foreign office. 
 
•  The federal ministry for economic cooperation and development (BMZ) is now defining 
development cooperation as part of a modern security policy and as an important asset in 
                                                           
15 See Klaus Bodemer and Detlef Nolte, Auf dem Weg zu einem transatlantischen Dreieck? Neue Akzentsetzungen 
in der deutschen, europäischen und US-amerikanischen Lateinamerikapolitik in den 90er Jahren, in: Lateinamerika. 
Analysen-Daten-Dokumentation 13 (1997), p.18-19. 
16 These sub-regional concepts have focused on the Andean Region, the Mercosur and Chile, Brazil, Mexico, 
Central America and the Caribbean. See the declaration of  the Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office, 
Ludger Vollmer on Latin America before the Bundestag, May 16, 2002; and the lecture of the Head of the Latin 
America Desk (Beauftragter für Lateinamerika) of the Federal Foreign Office, Georg Boomgarden, before the 
Deutsch-Ibero-Amerikanische Gesellschaft in Frankfurt on May 8, 2001 on “Deutsche Lateinamerikapolitik unter 
Bedingungen der Globalisierung”  
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/archiv_print?archiv_id=3158 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/pdf/reden/2001/r010508a.pdf 
On the Andean region concept see Helmut Schöps, Das Andenländerkonzept der Bundresregierung und die 
europäische Andenländerpolitik, in: Sabine Kurtenbach, Mechthild Minkner-Bünjer, and Andreas Steinhauf (eds.), 
Die Andenregion – Neuer Krisenbogen in Lateunamerika, Frankfurt/M. 2004, p.401-412.  
17 See “Konzept für die entwicklungspolitische Zusammenarbeit mit den Ländern Lateinamerikas“, February 15, 
2000.  
(http://www.bmz.de/themen/ArbeitRegionen/Lateinamerika-Konzept.pdf) 
18 It’s remarkable that there has also been a diminishing academic interest in German Latin American politics. In the 
mid-nineties there was a short “boom” of publications on German Latin American Politics, see Wolf Grabendorff, 
Germany and Latin America: A Complex Relationship, in: Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 35 
(1993-94) 4, p.43-100; Heinrich-W. Krumwiede and Detlef Nolte, Perspektiven einer Lateinamerikapolitik 
Deutschlands als Handelsstaat und Zivilmacht, in: Lateinamerika Jahrbuch 1994, Frankfurt/M. 1994, p.9-44; 
Manfred Mols and Christoph Wagner (eds.), Deutschland – Lateinamerika, Frankfurt/M. 1994. Afterwards there 
have been no substantial academic investigations on this topic.    7 
crisis prevention.
19 In this way the BMZ, which in the German coalition governments has 
functioned as a “secondary” foreign ministry
20, is trying to claim stakes in Germany’s 
foreign policy.
21 In the past the federal foreign office had tended to relegate the BMZ to 
countries of minor strategic or economic importance (this included many Latin American 
countries, but it excluded the most important ones). Today, however, the BMZ has 
developed some special competence in the area of new security threats
22 and a certain 




The BMZ has defined three main areas (“Schwerpunkte”) in its Latin American policy: the 
fight against poverty; the protection of the environment and the natural resources; and the 
modernization of state and society. Activities in the last area are perceived and defined as a 
contribution to preventing future social and political crisis and as part of an active policy of 
securing peace.
24 These activities particularly focused on the protection of human rights, on 
reforms in the judicial sector, and on the promotion of political decentralization. The policy 
orientation of the BMZ is reflected in the programs of the German agency for development 
cooperation, GTZ
25, and the work of the political parties’ foundations
26, which in most of their 
international programs is financed by the BMZ. 
 
                                                           
19 See the presentations of the State Secretaries at the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development,  
Uschi Eid and  Erich Strather, before the Bundesakademie for Sicherheitspolitik (BAKS) (Federal Academy on 
Security Policy), 30/5/2002 and 26/05/2003 (http://www.bmz.de/presse/redeneid/rede200205301.html; 
http://www.bmz.de/presse/redenstather/rede20030526.html). See Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul (Federal Minister for 
Economic Cooperation and Development), Rede anlässlich des Aktuellen Forums zur Sicherheitspolitik für 
Chefredakteure und Ressortleiter am 27. January 2004 in Berlin zum Thema: "Keine Sicherheit ohne Gerechtigkeit - 
Entwicklungspolitik ist Friedenspolitik" http://www.bmz.de/presse/reden/rede20040127.html 
20 During the Kohl administration, based on a coalition of the Christian Democrats (CDU) with the Liberals (FDP), 
the foreign ministry was headed by a Liberal, while the ministry of economic cooperation and development was 
headed by a member of the Bavarian section of the Christian Democrats (CSU). The Schröder administration, which 
is based on a coalition of the Social Democrats (SPD) with the Greens, a similar division is made, with the Green 
party heading the ministry of foreign affairs and the Social Democrats the ministry of economic cooperation and 
development. Last but not least the chancellor himself is a strong actor in foreign relations. This reflects the 
globalization process, which influences many domestic policy areas, as much as the new security threats after 
September 11. As a result, today it is much more difficult (and at the same time more necessary!) for the foreign 
ministry to develop a coherent and comprehensive strategy for Latin America.   
21 On the issue of development policy in the Schröder government see Peter Molt, Rot-grüne Entwicklungspolitik 
seit 1989, in: Hanns Maull, Sebastian Harnisch, and Constantin Grund (eds.), Deutschland im Abseits? Rot-grüne 
Außenpolitik 1998-2003, Baden-Baden 2003, p.163-175 
22 The BMZ now forms part of the Federal Security Council (Bundessicherheitsrat) which is constituted by the 
chancellor, the secretary of the Bundeskanzleramt, the ministers of foreign affairs, defence, finance, economy, 
interior, justice and, since the Schröder government, the minister of economic cooperation and development. The 
Bundessicherheitsrat coordinates the security policy of the German government, including decisions on arms 
exports. Its meetings are non-public.    
23 For example, the Federal Foreign Office has supported the creation of the Centre for Peace-keeping Operations 
(ZIF = Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze)  http://www.zif-berlin.org/de/index.html while the Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development coordinates the Civil Peace Service (ZFD = Zentraler 
Friedensdienst) http://www.bmz.de/themen/Handlungsfelder/friedenssicherung/friedensdienst/index.html 
24 Securing Peace (Friedenssicherung) is defined as a central policy focus (Handlungsfeld) of the BMZ 
http://www.bmz.de/themen/Handlungsfelder/friedenssicherung/index.html 
25 The GTZ offers programs on political reforms (including the rule of law and the fight against corruption) but also 
a more general program on crisis prevention and conflict transformation with several areas, including reforms of the 
security sector. On the GTZ programs see http://www.gtz.de/themen/english/index.html.  
26 The christian democratic Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, the socialdemocratic Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung, the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung of the Green Party, and the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung of  the Liberal 
Party (FDP).   8 
The BMZ has concentrated the development cooperation in a number of so-called “focus 
countries” (Schwerpunktländer)
27, while reducing the cooperation with the more developed 
countries in Latin America. This programmatic decision tends to create some contradiction 
between the BMZ involvement and what would be the political engagement more adequately 
reflecting Germany’s strategic interests in Latin America. As a consequence, this discrimination 
against the more developed countries has repeatedly been criticized by the political opposition 
(for instance this was the case after the economic and social breakdown in Argentina). 
 
In spite of the BMZ’s new activities, diplomats from Latin America do not perceive a 
growing influence of the Ministry in Germany’s Latin American policy. One reason is the 
reduction of funds for Latin America
28, which is now competing with Eastern Europe and the 
Near East. Moreover, there are many topics – as the summits between the European Union
29 and 
Latin America or the free trade agreements with Latin American countries - where the BMZ only 
has a very limited influence. Most Latin American governments (especially the important ones) 
are more interested in “the real thing” - that is,  trade and investment - than in the “side-dishes” 
offered by development cooperation.  
 
Because of the limited importance of the region in German foreign policy there is little 
partisan conflict on Latin American issues - and if any conflict arises, it has little political 
importance and implications. There has been some nostalgic romanticism on Cuba  amongst 
some in  the governing social democratic party; on Venezuela, the Christian democratic 
opposition tends to call for a more critical approach to the government of Hugo Chávez.
30 On 
Colombia, the Christian Democrats show more support for the policies of the Uribe 
administration than the Schröder government. On all these issues, however, the differences are of 
degree and not of substance. 
 
Some politicians, lobbyists from exporting companies and academics with a special interest 
in Latin America are claiming that Latin America deserves more attention in German politics. In 
fact, the attention deficit is a recurring topic in German-Latin American relations
31  as it is in 
U.S.-Latin American relations.
32 In the end, one has to accept that the “good old days” in 
German-Latin American relations will not come back. Instead, one has to look at the real bases 




                                                           
27 In Latin America these countries are Bolivia, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru. A more reduced 
development cooperation is maintained with Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Mexico, and Paraguay. 
28 In the fiscal years 1998-2000 Latin American countries on average received 12,8% of German bilateral foreign aid 
(ODA). In 2000 the bilateral net transfers of development aid  to Latin America amounted to 375 Mio Euro (BMZ, 
Medienhandbuch Entwicklungszusammenarbeit 2002, Bonn 2003,  p.362).   
29 The abolition of the European Council on Development Policy in 2002 has reduced the influence of the BMZ on 
the European level, see Molt, p. 165.  
30  See for example the draft of a resolution by some MPs of the CDU “Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit 
unterstützen – Freiheit der Medien und wirtschaftliche Prosperität wiederherstellen” from January 27, 2004 
(Bundestagsdrucksache 15/2389)  
http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/15/023/1502389.pdf 
31 See for example, from 20 years ago:  ADLAF, Die Beziehungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu 
Lateinamerika: Bestandsaufnahme und Empfehlungen, Bonn 1983. 
32 See Mark Falcoff, The Return of the U.S. Attention Deficit toward Latin America, Latin American Outlook, 
March 2003; Andrés Oppenheimer, U.S. attention to Latin American sinks to new lows, in: The Miami Herald  June 
1, 2003.   9 
Consensus in the Diagnosis on Security Threats in Latin America  
 
 
If we look at the security threats and challenges mentioned in the Declaration on Security in the 
Americas adopted at the OAS Special Conference on Security (October 27-28, 2003)
33 there are 
no differences between the perceptions in Germany or Europe and in the Western Hemisphere.
34 
In the document the following issues are mentioned with special emphasis:  terrorism, 
transnational organized crime, the global drug problem, corruption, asset laundering, illicit 
trafficking in weapons, and the connections among them; trafficking in persons; attacks to cyber 
security; the possibility of access, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction and their 
means of delivery by terrorists.  
 
Most European Governments can also agree with the proposed Commitments and 
Cooperation Measures of the OAS Special Conference. The Europeans also coincide with their 
Latin American counterparts on more topics than the U.S. administration, which dissented on the 
support of the Ottawa Convention and on the goal of turning the Hemisphere into a zone free of 
anti-personnel landmines. The U.S. government also objected to the Latin American position that 
the global climate change could constitute a threat or challenge for the security of the states of 
the Hemisphere. The Bush administration refused a commitment to work in coordination with 
the purpose to mitigate the adverse effects that changes in the global climate could have on the 
states in the region and to develop cooperation mechanisms in accordance with the international 
efforts in this field.  
 
If we take a look at the Latin America Regional Strategy Document of the European 
Commission from April 2002
35 we find the following sketch of problems in the region: “political 
systems are still fragile, particularly in the Andean region but also in Central America. … Drug 
trafficking, combined with corruption and violence, is a factor of political, economic and social 
instability as is terrorism. Resolving these problems in the context of support for the peace 
processes and the fight against drugs and small arms trafficking is one of the priorities of 
international aid.” (p.9) “Exclusion and social marginalization are factors that aggravate 
insecurity, violence and rising crime levels that affect these societies”. (p.10) The threat 
perceptions are not so different from the OAS  perspective, but the suggestions and strategies for 
cooperation with Latin America are quite sketchy and do not include security-related topics.
36 
The priorities for the years 2002-2006 are: strengthening the partnership of civil society 
networks; reducing social inequalities by identifying actions targeted at disadvantaged groups; 
and strengthening natural disaster prevention.  
 
German politicians coincide with most of the Latin American threat perceptions in the 
region. They coincide also with the United States, but diverge on the apocalyptic mood 
expressed by the policy papers of some influential U.S. think tanks and in reports of institutes for 
                                                           
33 OEA/Ser.K/XXXVIII CES/DEC.1/03 rev. 1 October 2003 
http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.oas.org/key_issues/eng 
34 It has been argued that the list of possible security threats is so exhaustive that all American Countries (including 
the United States) could subscribe it, see Gabriel Marcella, Comentario sobre la Declaración de Seguridad en las 
Américas”, in: Newsletter RESDAL No.13 (noviembre/diciembre 2003), p.9. If this is so, it should not be difficult to 
find support from the Europeans, too.  
35See http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/la/rsp/02_06_en.pdf 
36  The suggestions and projects are more specific in the country strategy papers and the regional strategy papers of 
the EU, see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/sp/index.htm    10  
strategic studies of the U.S. armed forces
37. In a Heritage Foundation background paper on South 
America from February 2004
38 we find a wild mix of all types of security threats, including 
criminals, illegal armies, terrorist groups influenced by Islamic fundamentalism and biological 
attacks from the South because of scant disaster prevention and poor health infrastructure. These 
threat scenarios follow the known script of overselling the threat in order to oversell the remedy. 
Maybe the U.S. Southern Command (and some of its allies in different think tanks) is 
dramatizing the threat scenarios in order to justify its own budget and raison d’être.   
 
On which issues does the German government coincide with the Latin American threat 
perceptions? 
  
•  The German government perceives a persistent and growing threat from the drug problem in 
Colombia and the neighboring countries, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador. Nearly all worldwide 
consumed  cocaine is produced in these countries. Other Latin American countries, 
especially Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil and a number of Caribbean islands, are important 
transit countries to Europe. In a German and European vision, drug trafficking is defined 
primarily as a problem which should be confronted by civil police forces. The German 
government certainly would not accept an argument stating that drugs, because of the high 
death toll resulting from their use, can be seen as equivalent to weapons of mass destruction, 
as has been argued recently by the Commander of the U.S. Southern Command.
39 But the 
Europeans do accept that drug trafficking is a serious problem. In the past only about 20% 
of the Latin American cocaine production entered the European market, now the percentage 
is up to 50%. According to estimates of IKPO-Interpol, each year between 150 and 170 
metric tons of cocaine are smuggled into the European Union
40. The principal countries of 
entry are Spain and the Netherlands, but also for this type of product, there exists a common 
European market. To monitor and combat the narco-traffickers, the German federal criminal 
police office (Bundeskriminalamt) has personnel in six Latin American embassies (Bogotá, 
Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Lima and Mexico City)
41. The German government 
supports bilateral and multilateral programs for the eradication of coca plantations via 
substitution through other crops. It favors trade liberalization measures for the countries that 
implement programs of drug substitution. However, Europeans tend to be very skeptical 
regarding the spraying of coca-plants with herbicides from the air because of its potential 
negative effects on people’s health and on the affected flora and fauna. Anyway the spraying 
solution does not create an alternative source of income for the coca planters. One should 
mention that the European drug problem is only in part a Latin American problem. Heroine 
comes from Asia (Afghanistan) and synthetic drugs are primarily produced in Eastern 
Europe, the Netherlands and Belgium.     
                                                           
37 As an example see the “Preface” by General James T. Hill, Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, in: Max 
G. Manwaring, Wendy Fontenela, and Mary Grizzard/Dennis Rempe, Buildings Regional Security Cooperation in 
the Western Hemisphere: Issues and Recommendations, SSI U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, October 2003: 
“Today the threat to the countries of the region is not the military force of the adjacent neighbor or some invading 
foreign power. Today’s foe is the terrorist, the narco-trafficker, the arms trafficker, the document forger, the 
international crime boss, and the money launderer. This threat is a weed that is planted, grown, and nurtured in the 
fertile ground of ungoverned spaces such as coastlines, rivers, and unpopulated border areas. This threat is watered 
and fertilized with money from drugs, illegal arms sales, and human trafficking. This threat respects neither 
geographical nor moral boundaries.” (p.v)  
38 See James Jay Carafano and Stephen Johnson, Strengthening America’s Southern Flank Requires a Better Effort, 
Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No.1727, February 20, 2004 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1727.cfm 
39 See “Preface” by General James T. Hill, Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, in: 
Manwaring/Fontenela/Grizzard/Rempe, p.vi 
40 See Bundeskriminalamt, Rauschgiftjahresbericht 2002, Wiesbaden  2003, p.105 
41 See Bundeskriminalamt, p.84   11  
 
•  Poverty is perceived as a destabilizing factor for Latin American democracies. It could be a 
breeding ground for criminal activities and political violence. Growing crime certainly is a 
factor which negatively  influences the investment climate for German and European 
companies in Latin America. The fight against poverty is one of the main focuses of 
German and European development cooperation. 
 
•  Increasing concern focuses on the risks of expanding lawless areas in weak states of the 
region, which could serve as havens for transnational organized crime and terrorist 
networks. Therefore the German government supports the strategic task of regaining control 
of lawless territories and enforcing the rule of law all over the country. German 
development cooperation focuses on the reform and modernization of the state, which, as 
we have  noted, includes decentralization, the reform of the courts and the judiciary system. 
Some official cooperation takes place with police forces of Latin American countries 
(especially in the combat against drug trafficking)
42.  In the future there could be more 
German and European cooperation on the reform of the Latin American police forces and 
the judiciary system.  
 
•  There is concern about activities (e.g. fund-raising) of members or sympathizers of the Al 
Quaeda network and other fundamentalist Islamic groups in Latin America
43, but as of now 
the German government does not hold information on strategic alliances between Islamic 
terrorist groups and Latin American guerrilla organizations.
44  
 
•  Illegal migration from Latin America for the moment is still predominantly a Spanish 
problem, but after entering in the territory of the European Union the illegal migration will 
not be restricted to this country. Concerns are growing  in Europe that the increased 
restrictions on access to the United States after September 11 could lead to a greater flow of 
Latin American immigrants to Europe. Quite a lot of Latin Americans – especially in 
Argentina - are in possession of EU passports and could enter the European Union without 
problems. Still, at present the issue of immigration from Latin America to Europe is of 
minor concern in comparison to the immigration from other regions and countries.
45 
 
•  The Latin American ecosystem is of great importance for the global climate.
46 The 
sustainable management and conservation of the natural resources in the region are 
perceived as a common task in German development co-operation with Latin American 
countries.  
                                                           
42 For the general topic of cooperation in the security sector see BMZ Spezial N° 56, Reform des Sicherheitssektors 
in Entwicklungsländern, Bonn 2002.  
(http://www.bmz.de/infothek/fachinformationen/spezial/spezial056/index.html) 
The German  agency for development cooperation GTZ has recently stepped up its expertise in this field, also 
publishing a strategy paper on this topic: Security-Sector Reform in Developing Countries, Eschborn October 2000 
(http://www.gtz.de/security-sector/download/GTZ_SSR_Engl.pdf). 
43 See Library of Congress. Federal Research Division, Terrorist and  Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border 
Area (TBA) of South America, Washington D.C. July 2003. 
44 See the written answer of  the minister of state at the Federal Foreign Office, Hans Martin Bury, to the Bundestag 
from November 24, 2003 (Bundestsagsdrucksache 15/2107, p.6). 
45 In a national survey from November 2003 of  the Institut für Demoskopie in Allensbach on behalf of the Konrad-
Adenauer–Stiftung only 20.5 % of the respondents perceived refugees as a serious threat in foreign policy, while 
68.8 % listed international terrorism as a serious threat, see Viola Neu, Die Deutschen und die Außen- und 
Europapolitik. Eine Umfrage der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Berlin, Februar 2004. 
http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/7_dokument_dok_pdf_4205_1.pdf 
46 In the same study of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 27.2 % of the respondents perceived climate change and 
pollution of the environment as a serious security threat.    12  
 
 
Differences in the Therapy: The United States and Germany   
 
If in the diagnosis of the Latin American security threats we find a great consensus between the 
United States and Germany/Europe, there are significant differences in the proposed therapies. 
From a European perspective it looks as if the United States had a certain preference for surgical 
operations, whilst the Europeans prefer less bloody treatments (“pills and homeopathic stuff”), 
insisting on complex approaches that involve actors and stake-holders on different levels of 
society. But at times the European approach seems closer to wishful thinking than to a real 
therapy. Recently, in some cases (e.g. Colombia), a kind of middle ground has been emerging, 
which accepts a minimum of surgery, if it is  accompanied by a set of more comprehensive and 
sustainable measures. Without this kind of integral approach, the surgeon risks that the disease 
will return - or that the patient might die from losing too much blood during the operation.  
 
European and German perspectives tend to show concern that the participation of military 
personnel in police tasks could be counterproductive and aggravate the human rights situation – 
we already mentioned this as a central point of dissent during the visit of the Colombian 
president Uribe in Europe. A certain risk persists that the United States - in the framework of the 
fight against international terrorism - will promote  closer ties between the police and the armed 
forces in Latin America
47. For a specialist on Latin American affairs, the claim for a more 
integrated and comprehensive security strategy (including civil and military personnel
48 and 
focusing on civil and military action) against an enemy that is difficult to locate
49, sounds 
reminiscent of the old counterinsurgency concepts of the 1960s and 70s.
50 The United States is 
also favoring a more active role of the Latin American military in civil action programs (road 
construction, medical care etc.). A militarization of social, economic or political problems could 
aggravate the situation in the region, instead of ameliorating it.
51 In a constellation of weak 
civilian institutions, growing social protest, a deteriorating security situation and inefficient 
                                                           
47 See Carafona and Johnson, p.7, 10; “Because terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations have 
characteristics of both military organizations and domestic criminals, cooperation between military and civilian law 
enforcement agencies at the various levels is key. While the United States has spent 20 years encouraging the 
separation of military and police functions in Latin America, it should rethink how it will work with each country’s 
unique security architecture.” For an interpretation of the new U.S. policy in Latin American military affairs by 
German scholars see Detlef Nolte and Anika Oettler, Lateinamerika: Der vergessene Hinterhof  der USA?, in: Aus 
Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 38-39/2003, September 15, 2003, p. 20-29. 
48See “Preface” by General James T. Hill, Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, in: 
Manwaring/Fontenela/Grizzard/Rempe, p.viii: “Armed forces must, within their constitutional and legal constraints, 
support and cooperate with law enforcement agencies in combating drugs and other transnational threats. Where the 
legal boundaries do not make sense, given current threats, they should engage in a honest dialogue with their 
democratically elected leaders to determine if laws and restrictions need revision.”  
49 The following description of the enemy is quite vague leaving ample room for all kinds of interpretation: “At 
base, the enemy now becomes the individual political actor that plans and implements the kind of violence which 
threatens national well-being and exploits the root causes of instability.” Max G. Manwaring, Security in the 
Americas: Neither Evolution Nor Devolution – Impasse, Special Series: Shaping the Regional Security Environment 
In Latin America, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2004, p.5.  
50 It certainly is no coincidence, that the paper by Manwarin/Fontela/Grizzard/Rempe contains a lot of references to 
these counterinsurgency experiences. 
51 Many Latin American authors share this concern about a “militarización“ or “securitización” of social and 
political problems; see Marcela Donadio, Comentarios sobre la Conferencia Especial sobre Seguridad, Newsletter 
REDAL Nr.13 (November/December 2003), p.7; Francisco Rojas Aravena, La CES del hemisferio americano. La 
dificíl construcción de consensus, in: Foreign Affairs En Español 3 (2003) 4, p.172-179 ; Pedro Villagra Delgado, 
Un nuevo paradigma de seguridad hemisférica, in: Foreign  Affairs En Español 3 (2003) 4, p.130-143;  Pedro 
Villagra Delgado, Luis Bitencourt, and Henry Medina Uribe, Perspectives From Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia, 
Special Series: Shaping the Regional Security Environment In Latin America, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, July 2003.     13  
police forces we could be on the way back to the 1970s with the military intervening in politics. 
With the fight against crime and terrorism, the risk is that human rights standards in the region 
will be watered down and the rule of law will be undermined. It would be pernicious if, in the 
name of fighting the new terrorist threats, the Latin American military would take up this 
stimulus to return to their strategies of the 60s and 70s.  
 
Europeans accept that hemispheric security in the more traditional and military sense is a 
U.S. task. The European countries do not have the military capabilities nor the political will to 
enter in this area, nor would the United States accept this. This does not exclude a certain level of 
arms trade with the region (sometimes in competition with the United States) and of training 
programs with Latin American military staff in Europe, but this is done on a modest scale in 
comparison with similar programs in the United States. In Germany, there seems to be a limited 
but constant interest in military training and cooperation with Latin America, although this 
cooperation is often hampered by the quite limited military capabilities of many of the Latin 
American armed forces.
 52   
 
The U.S. government has a certain communication problem with Europe in its Latin 
America security policies. It would be easier if the European partners (and also some Latin 
American partners) could be integrated in a common approach to confront the region’s security 
risks. In effect, the goals are very much compatible; but the prospective partners would prefer to 
be informed and consulted in time and not only invited ex-post to play their part in policy 
decisions and strategies pre-fabricated in Washington D.C. The United States should come to 
accept the idea that it could be in its own strategic interest if its friends and partners across the 
Atlantic are invited to enter in its geographic neighborhood and to form a political joint venture 
operation aiming to raise the standard of living, to improve the infrastructure and to increase 
security in Latin America. As in real life, sometimes the far away relative has better access and is 
more welcome than the rich neighbor.     
 
At the same time, in Europe as in the Uni t e d  S t a t e s  w e  a l s o  h a v e  s o m e  h o m e w o r k  
assignments pending. Drug trafficking and money laundering are not only Latin American 
problems. In fact, more drug money is circulating and being laundered in the developed countries 
than in Latin America. Moreover, the financial safe havens normally are not protected by Latin 
American drug traffickers but by economic interests in the United States and Europe. Drug 
trafficking is a multilateral problem, and we cannot demand that the Latin American countries 
are to bear the major burden in the fight against drug production. Europe and the United States 
should offer more economic compensation. If the U.S. government demands more cooperation in 
security issues which are of high importance in its own agenda, it should also accept the security 
priorities and threat perceptions of the Latin American and European countries.  
 
Irrespective of some communication deficits, in recent times Europe (including 
Germany) and the United States appeared to be more in tune than in the past in a number of 
crisis situations in Latin America in Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia or Haiti.  Cuba currently has 
lost much of its potential for conflict between the U.S. government and Europe, thanks to a lot of 
                                                           
52 Since 1990, some 70 officers (including 21 since 2000) from Latin American militaries participated  in the 
international course of the German Armed Forces Military Academy (Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr) in 
Hamburg. There  are special cooperation programs with Argentina, Chile and Brazil, including training programs for 
members of the general staff and regular (annual or biennal) bi-national meetings between members of the general 
staffs of the Bundeswehr and their Latin American counterparts. The German government has military attachés in 
their embassies in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Mexico, but in none of the two hotspots in Latin America, 
Colombia and Venezuela. Since 1980, Venezuela sent 22 officers to the Bundeswehr training programs in Hamburg. 
There has been no participant from Colombia.    14  
help by Fidel Castro himself. On the one hand, the U.S. government and the U.S. Congress have 
shown some flexibility in the application of the embargo, notably regarding medicine and food. 
As a result the United States has become an important source of Cuban imports since 2000. On 
the other hand, the relations between Cuba and the European Union for quite some time an issue 
of conflict between the United States and the European Union - I will mention only the Helms-
Burton-Act - turned sour in 2003, with the EU countries today taking a much tougher stand 
towards the Castro regime and human rights violations in Cuba.
53 This tougher approach has 
always been advocated by the Scandinavian countries as well as by Italy, Spain and the United 
Kingdom.  EU policy towards the island is based on the Common Position (CP) on Cuba from 
1996, which stated that the objective of the European Union in its relation with Cuba is to 
encourage a process of peaceful transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights 
and civil liberties. 
 
The divisive issue between Cuba and the European Union was the arrest of Cuban 
dissidents in March 2003 and the execution of the hijackers of a ferry. In the same month the 
European Union had opened an official representation in Havana. Afterwards, the European 
Union first suspended the negotiations on Cuba’s admission to the Contonou-Agreement with the 
APC countries. In June and July 2003 the European Union decided to give a low profile to its 
relations with Cuba, to limit the bilateral high-level governmental visits, to reduce the profile of 
Member States' participation in cultural events, to invite Cuban dissidents to the celebration of 
national holidays in the embassies on the Island and to proceed in the re-evaluation of the EU 
common position. In reaction the Cuban government renounced on European economic aid. It is 
possible that in the future Castro will try some other policy switches in the EU-USA-Cuba 
triangle as he has done in the past
54 to obtain advantages in his quest for securing his rule. 
Nevertheless, today a less conflictive and more coordinated Cuba policy from the European 
Union and the United States would be possible, if both sides don’t miss the opportunity.  
 
In Germany there is still some discussion about the best political approach to Cuba. The 
present government, based on a coalition of Social Democrats and Greens, had decided in 1999 
to enter in negotiations with the Cuban government in order to open the path for bilateral 
development cooperation, but these negotiations have been discontinued.  Therefore, the 
cooperation still excludes state agencies and focuses on actors of civil society (with all the 
problems involved in identifying such actors). In 2000 the minister of economic cooperation 
made a visit to Cuba. In the following year (2001), the minister of economy and the president of 
the German Bundestag also visited the island and the Cuban vice-president Carlos Lage returned 
the visits in 2000 and 2002. In parts of the social democratic party, which in government is 
condemned to pragmatism and the gradual reduction of the welfare state, Cuba has evoked some 
nostalgia. The federal minister for economic cooperation and development, Heidemarie 
Wieczorek-Zeul, in May 2003 still argued against canceling development cooperation with Cuba 
pointing to the potential to influence events in Cuba through cooperation with civil society 
actors
55 (“change through development”). Nevertheless, the German government complied – and 
in some aspects overacted – with the EU policies and suspended nearly all cooperation projects 
with Cuba, including academic interchange. Only NGOs and the foundations of the political 
parties can continue their projects, but these projects have to support economic reforms or 
                                                           
53 See Susanne Gratius, Annäherung der amerikanischen und europäischen Kuba-Politik, SWP-Aktuell 42, 
November 2003. 
54 See Susanne Gratius, Kuba unter Castro – Das Dilemma der dreifachen Blockade. Die kontraproduktive Politik 
der ‚Demokratieförderung’ seitens der USA und der EU, Opladen 2003.  
55 Look at the article by the Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, Heidemarie Wieczorek-
Zeul, “Wandel durch Zusammenarbeit. Ein Ende der Entwicklungshilfe für Kuba verhindert weitere Reformen” in:  
Financial Times German edition from 2.5.2003 (http://www.bmz.de/presse/reden/rede20030502.html).   15  
promote a democratic opening.  After the invitation of Cuban dissidents to the reception in the 
German embassy in Havana on the German national holiday (3rd of October) in 2003, the Cuban 
government cut down on its contacts with the German embassy and the German government.  
 
The relations between most of the European countries (including Germany) with 
Colombia are quite complicated. In the German and other European governments a certain 
disillusion was felt after the failure of the peace talks between the Pastrana government and the 
guerilla movements
56. While there is some acceptance for the Uribe government putting pressure 
on the guerrillas, few politicians in Europe believe that the Colombian government can win the 
war with military instruments. The Colombian government had limited success in explaining its 
position to the European governments, but it seems as if there was no success with German and 
European NGOs, which keep criticizing  the Colombian government’s approach. Many 
Europeans – in the governments and in the NGOs - are arguing that the security measures 
adopted by the Uribe administration are violating human rights. A focus of this criticism is the 
new anti-terrorism legislation, which grants powers of arrest and interrogation to the Colombian 
armed forces with limited judicial control. Particular concern is expressed to the  double standard 
used by the Uribe government in the treatment of the right-wing paramilitaries (which are 
negotiating impunity) and the treatment of the left-wing guerilla movement. The European 
Union officially criticizes some measures in Uribe’s fight against drug production such as the 
fumigation from air, because of their potential collateral damages on the ecosystem and the 
people living in these areas.
57  
 
The German government and its European partners favor a policy of drug substitution 
through other crops – but it is not clear who will pay for this program. The German government, 
as the other European governments, expects that the Colombian government will comply with 
the recommendations of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
58 which are 
also mentioned in the Declaration of the London Meeting on International Support for Colombia 
(July 10, 2003)
59. The Colombian government, in turn, demands that the European Union put not 
only the FARC but also the ELN on its blacklist of terrorist organizations. There has been no 
reaction from the European Union in this matter and, when asked about its position on the issue, 
the  German government refers to the European Union
60 (but it seems that the Schröder 
government will now support such a move).  The Colombian government also wants to renew 
existing trade preferences with Europe as a means to support alternative crops and exports (not 
drugs). Regarding Colombia, it seems that the German opposition shows a little more sympathy 
for the efforts of the Uribe government than the German government, but this could be a result of 
the different functions of government and opposition.  
 
                                                           
56 For some German opinions on the Colombian conflict – including a personal commentary by the representative 
for Latin America in the Foreign Ministry – at the end of the Pastrana administration and during the Uribe 
administration,  see Sabine Kurtenbach (ed.), Kolumbien zwischen Gewalteskalation und Friedenssuche. 
Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Einflussnahme externer Akteure, Frankfurt/M. 2001. About the EU policy in the 
Andean region and Colombia, see Christian Frères,  Die Europäische Union und die Krise der Andenländer: 
Zwischen Status quo und strategischer Vermittlung, in: Kurtenbach, Minkner-Bünjer, and Steinhauf, p. 383-400; 
Joaquín Roy, La Unión Europea  ante Cuba y Colombia: de buenas intenciones y altas esperanzas a notables 
contradicciones y grandes frustraciones, in: América Latina Hoy Vol.31, agosto 2002, p.33-61. 
57 See the answer from the State Secretary at the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Erich 
Strather,  to the Bundestag from January 6, 2002 (Bundestagsdrucksache 15/288, p.75). 
58 See United Nations High Commission for Human Rights. Office Colombia,  Recommendations for Colombia 
2003, Bogotá, March 2003; Recomendaciones para Colombia 2004, marzo 2004 (http://www.hchr.org.co/) 
59 London Meeting on International Support for Colombia, July 10, 2003, London Declaration. 
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/030710dono2.htm 
60 See the answer from the State Secretary of the Federal Foreign Office, Jürgen Chrobog, September 17, 2003 
(Bundestagsdrucksache 15/1556, p.6).   16  
The same is true with respect to the positions towards the Chávez government in 
Venezuela. All agree that the political situation is very complicated and the economy is a mess, 
but the CDU takes a more critical stand. They see the risk that Chávez could attack the 
opposition media and suspend the plebiscite on his revocation. In contrast, the government 
parties see the Venezuelan opposition (including the press) as part of the problems of the country 
rather than as its solution, and therefore they favor a more cautious approach. The OAS, and 
other institutions such as the Carter Center, should be supported in their efforts to find a peaceful 
settlement for the Venezuelan  crisis. 
 
The social and political crisis in Bolivia is perceived as a  serious challenge for 
development cooperation with Latin America since Bolivia had been one of the darlings of 
German and international development cooperation. A failure in this country could put in 
question all our development strategies and become a negative example for the entire region. 
Bolivia is one of the select groups of official “focus countries” (Schwerpunktländer) of German 
development cooperation. Since 2000, the German government has allocated more than 60 
Million Euros in development cooperation with Bolivia. Actually Germany is the third partner in 
importance of foreign aid to Bolivia (after Japan and the United States). In the framework of the 
HIPC II-Initiative (Highly Indebted Poor Countries), the German government has condoned 
Bolivian debts with a total value of 361 Millions of Euro.  
 
The Argentinean crisis has faded, but the fundamental problems of the country persist. 
Germany has shown mixed attitudes towards the country. On the one hand, the German 
government had to defend the interests of German investors and bond holders; therefore it had to 
prevent the Argentinean default from being  copied by other debtor nations. On the other hand, 
the German government had an interest in stabilizing the Argentinean economy and democracy 
and to prevent a contagion to other Latin American countries. Last but not least, the Argentinean 
crisis was perceived as part of the general debate on the need for reforming the international 
financial system. In Germany, discussions have been taking place between the opposition and the 
ministry of economic cooperation and development in order to find out whether it would be wise 
to drop Argentina from the list of countries that receive German cooperation funds. In this case, 
national per capita income could be a bad indicator of the real necessities of the country in 
question; and narrow cooperation criteria of the BMZ could contradict more important national 
interests.    
 
In Haiti, the most recent hotspot in the Western Hemisphere, the United States and 
Europe are cooperating. France is actively participating with troops, the European Union will 
contribute funds. Because of the refugee problem, Haiti is of much more concern for the United 
States than for Europe. Exceptions are France, because of historical ties to its former colony, and 
to a minor degree the other European countries with special interests in the Caribbean. Germany 
never had committed much development funds to this country; in the academic field, Germany 







                                                           
61 For a German commentary on the Haitian crisis see Astrid Nissen, Haiti nach Aristide: Die Konturen der Krise, 
in: Brennpunkt Lateinamerika 4-2004; Susanne Gratius and Ronja Kempin, Wer rettet Haiti? SWP Aktuell 9, März 
2004  
http://www.swp-
berlin.org/common/get_document.php?id=792&PHPSESSID=32c67472ae315f6bbf3a191664a6560d   17  
Latin American-European Partnership 
 
Europe and Latin America have clear preferences for multilateralism in international relations. 
Both sides are in favor of regional integration to confront the challenges of globalization and 
global governance. The Europeans would prefer to have strong Latin American partners for 
cooperation not only in economic but also in security-related issues. The existing discussion 
forums between the regions, like the meetings of the Rio Group with the European Union or the 
European-Latin American Summits, at present cannot substitute national actors with their own 
power resources.    
 
There is consensus on both sides of the Atlantic that Brazil is a pivotal actor in South 
America.
62  The United States would like to cultivate Brazil as a hemispheric sub-regional 
hegemonic power, which acts in their interest and helps to stabilize the region. The Europeans 
support this position, but they prefer a more independent posture of Brazil, which is perceived as 
a potential ally in international affairs (including some transatlantic conflicts) and as a 
counterbalance to total U.S. predominance in the Western Hemisphere. In 1995, Chancellor Kohl 
and President Cardoso launched the idea of a German-Brazilian Strategic Partnership.
63 The 
Schröder government and President  Lula have continued this special relationship between 
Germany and Brazil.
64 Both governments see themselves as motors in the bi-regional relations.   
 
There are few other partners for security cooperation. Mexico is too close to the United 
States and Mexican security problems, in a certain way, are also U.S. security problems. Chile is 
a  politically stable and economically successful country, however it is small, and, in the 
perception of some neighbors, an overachiever. But the country recently demonstrated its 
specific military capabilities when – as the only Latin American nation
65 - it mustered the 
political will and the operational capacity to dispatch troops on short notice to Haiti, where 
Chilean military will serve together with Canadian, French and U.S. forces. Argentina is still in a 
complicated economic situation and vulnerable to pressure by foreign governments and 
international lenders. Because of the lack of funds and the deterioration of its equipment, the 
Argentine military has quite limited capabilities. 
 
Some years ago, there have been some fears of growing economic competition between 
Europe and the United States in Latin America. Stimulated by some geo-economic writings
66 and 
as a reaction to the common market in Europe, the United States seemed to embark on a strategy 
of consolidating its own exclusive zone of influence in Latin America (creating NAFTA, pushing 
for FTAA). But the European Union reacted by entering in free trade negotiations with Mexico, 
Chile and the Mercosur. Two princes courted the Latin American Cinderella.
67     
                                                           
62  Brazil’s role in South America and in international relations are discussed from a German-Brazilian perspective 
in Gilberto Calcagnotto and Detlef Nolte (eds.), Südamerika zwischen US-amerikanischer Hegemonie und 
brasilianischem Führungsanspruch, Frankfurt/M 2002; Susanne Gratius, Die Außenpolitik der Regierung Lula. 
Brasiliens Aufstieg von einer diskreten Regional- zu einer kooperativen Führungsmacht, SWP-Studie 7, Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, März 2004 Wilhelm Hofmeister, Lateinamerika und die neuen Dimensionen 
internationaler Sicherheit. Aufgaben für Brasilien, in: KAS-Auslandsinformationen 4/2001, p.4-28  
http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/auslandsinformationen/7_dokument_dok_pdf_289_1.pdf 
63 Germany and Brazil support each other in their quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. 
64 See the speech by State Secretary of the Federal Foreign Office, Jürgen Chrobog in Rio de Janeiro (October 27, 
2003), The Future of the Geman-Brazilian Strategic Partnership  
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/aussenpolitik/regionaslkonzepte/lateinamerika 
65 Brazil and Argentina have committed troops for a later phase of peace-keeping in Haiti.  
66 See C. Fred Bergsten, The Primacy of Economics, in: Foreign Policy Nr.87, summer 1992, p.3-24. 
67 See Detlef Nolte, Kontinent der Zukunft? Geoökonomische Interessen der USA und Europas in Lateinamerika, in: 
Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 6/1995, p.728-737; Klaus Bodemer and Detlef Nolte, Auf dem Weg   18  
 
Times have changed. The passion for Latin America has cooled down, pragmatism 
dominates the day. On the one hand, in the last years Latin America has lost much of its 
economic sex appeal, in many regions and countries U.S. preponderance is a fact. One the other 
hand, Mexico and Chile have demonstrated that it is possible to enter in free trade agreements 
with the European Union and the United States at the same time. In Europe the fear of FTAA has 
faded. As for the moment the FTAA project will come into being only as a “FTAA light” it will 
leave a great margin of action to all involved. European economic and trade efforts in Latin 
America now are perceived not as adverse but as complementary – as is  the German position - 




The post-September 11 world is characterized by a growing involvement of  German and 
European armed forces in many hotspots around the world (Afghanistan, Iraq etc.). We have 
observed some serious problems in the  transatlantic relations between the “Old Europeans” – 
especially France, Germany and Belgium - and the U.S. administration in the run-up to the Iraq 
conflict. In this context there can be no doubt that Latin America is of minor concern for the 
European countries. For the moment there is no risk of an U.S.-European confrontation on Latin 
American topics. Nevertheless Europe and Germany could be valuable partners of the United 
States and the Latin American countries in confronting the security threats in the Western 
Hemisphere. Currently French military is participating in a joint action with Canadian, Chilean 
and U.S. armed forces in Haiti. But military “hard power” is not the most important contribution 
Europe can make to dealing with the security problems of Latin America.  
 
Not only Latin American and European governments, but also the U.S. administration 
agree on most of the threat perceptions and security challenges in the region, while differences 
subsist in the ranking of problems and with regard to the proposed solutions. For the United 
States, international terrorism and drug trafficking are the first priority, whereas the Latin 
Americans attach more importance to poverty, crime and political instability. The Europeans and 
the Germans take a middle stand, but are closer to the Latin American position. The same could 
be said with regard to the remedies. The U.S. administration shows a certain preference for 
military solutions; the European and the Latin American governments focus on reforms in state 
and society as a means to tackle many security-related problems in the region at their roots. The 
EU External Relations Commissioner, Christopher Patten, emphasized in a speech on U.S.-
European relations that the European Union cannot match the United States in military “hard 
power” but that it can offer a lot of “soft power” (development assistance and so on)
68. The same 
applies to Germany, which in the post-WW II-era has been characterized as a “civilian power” 
(Zivilmacht) in international relations. Most  experts on German foreign policy agree that this 
concept is still valid for present-day Germany.
69   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
zu einem transatlantischen Dreieck? Neue Akzentsetzung in der deutschen, europäischen und US-amerikanischen 
Lateinamerikapolitik in den 90er Jahren, in: Lateinamerika. Analysen-Daten-Dokumentation Nr.33 (1997), p.7-34.  
68 Christopher Patten, Europe and America – has the transatlantic relationship run out of road? Speech at Lady 
Margret Hall, Oxford, February  13, 2004. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/sp04_77.htm 
69 The concept of “civilian power” today includes an emphasis on the promotion  of democracy and state building. It 
also includes the development of strong links between democratic governments all over the world as a contribution 
for civilizing international relations; see Hanns W. Maull, ”Normalisierung” oder Auszehrung? Deutsche 
Außenpolitik im Wandel, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 11, 8. März 2004, p.17-23 (22-23) 
http://www.das-parlament.de/2004/11/Beilage/003.html   19  
The greater part of Latin America’s security problems could be dealt with “soft power”
70, 
which includes economic cooperation measures, political dialogue or persuasion and 
development assistance. Some of the harder topics in Latin America should be confronted by 
police forces rather than by the military. This type of “hardware” could also be available from 
European sources.  
 
Latin America is still a region characterized by political instability and severe security 
problems. In the near future the U.S. government may be compelled to direct more attention and 
more resources towards its Southern neighbors.  For that reason it should be in the strategic 
interest of the United States that the Europeans, including Germany, collaborate in coping with 
the security problems in Latin America.  The European countries and Germany have built up 
some particular “soft powers” in development assistance and related topics which could be 
useful for Latin America; however, from time to time one should ask whether the results always 
validate past expenditures. It is important to note that between Europe and Latin America more 
cultural and political affinities exist than with the Islamic world or the Asian countries. This 
could be a great advantage for cooperation in security-related issues.  Some issues for 
development assistance between the European Union and Latin America could be the reform of 
the state, the stabilization of democratic institutions and the reform and the strengthening of the 
civilian security forces.
 71  
 
The issues for cooperation in security-related issues between Europe and  Latin America 
are almost unlimited, but we are confronted with a recurring problem in the cooperation between 
Germany or the European Union and Latin America: many times words do not match with deeds. 
Free trade is hampered by agricultural subsidies, development assistance or by the lack of 
funds.
72 Because of the growing involvement in other world regions, which have more 
immediate strategic importance for Germany and the European Union, the funds available for 
Latin America are rather limited. If the Europeans should reduce their engagement in the region 
and if the U.S. administration should concentrate their cooperation efforts on the military, a real 
risk exists that we could return to the political constellations of the 1960s and 70s. For this 




                                                           
70  This is also the conclusion in the Report of an Independent Commission Sponsored by the Council on Foreign 
Relations. Center for Preventive Action, Andes 2020: A New Strategy for the Challenges of Colombia and the 
Region, January 2004, p. 2: “The strategy outlined in this report is built on the widely shared belief that sustainable, 
peaceful democracies in the Andean region depend as much on political, legal, and socioeconomic reform – 
including the implementation of wide-ranging development initiatives targeted to the poor majorities and 
disenfranchised rural population – as on “hard” counternarcotics and counterterror initiatives.”( 
http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Andes2020.pdf) 
71 Because of legal restrictions the U.S. government faces obstacles for training Latin American police forces, so 
that the Europeans could complement U.S. efforts in training security forces. See Carafano and Johnson, p.6  
72 In Germany in the 1990s the funds for international activities as a percentage of the federal budget have  been 
reduced, see Gunther Hellmann, Von Gipfelstürmern und Gratwanderern: “Deutsche Wege” in der Außenpolitik, in: 
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 11 – 8.März 2004, p. 32-40 (p.35) 
http://www.das-parlament.de/2004/11/Beilage/005p.pdf  